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Abstract 
              Mauthner esteemed language as a philosophical inquiry. He measured the 
philosophical entailments between language and reality and the consequent knowledge 
produced by such entailments. He questioned language’s aptitude to express and 
represent reality and, according to him, language is a critical source of knowledge and 
an unfaithful representation of reality, because there is a gap between language and 
reality, i.e. language distorts perception and engenders false and fictitious assumptions 
about reality. Language fosters superstition, creates gods and idols and exerts a 
dominating power over the intellect. Mauthner pointed out a critique of language based 
on metaphors, which would serve to address and clarify the deformation of reality. 
Wittgenstein, unlike himself suggested, was inspired by Mauthner. Both showed interest 
toward the critical analysis of language and there are many conceptual similarities 
between their language’s conceptions (e.g. concerning the use of metaphors to 
understand language). Therefore, this paper seeks a) to emphasize Mauthner’s 
metaphors on language as an accurate interpretation regarding the philosophical 
entailments between language and reality, and b) to demonstrate the epistemological 
legacy of Mauthner’s critique of language to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. 
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Resumo  
            Mauthner encarava a linguagem como uma investigação filosófica. Assim, 
mediu os vínculos filosóficos entre linguagem e realidade e o consequente 
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conhecimento produzido por tais vínculos e questionou a aptidão da linguagem para 
expressar e representar a realidade. Segundo Mauthner, a linguagem é uma fonte crítica 
de conhecimento e uma representação infiel da realidade, dado que há uma lacuna entre 
linguagem e realidade, ou seja, a linguagem distorce a perceção e engendra premissas 
falsas e fictícias sobre a realidade. A linguagem acolhe superstições, cria deuses e ídolos 
e exerce um poder dominante sobre o intelecto. Mauthner apontou uma crítica da 
linguagem baseada em metáforas, que serviriam para abordar e clarificar a deformação 
da realidade. Wittgenstein, ao contrário do que sugeriu, foi inspirado por Mauthner. 
Ambos mostraram interesse relativamente à análise crítica da linguagem e existem 
muitas semelhanças concetuais entre as suas conceções do idioma (por exemplo, sobre o 
uso de metáforas para entender a linguagem). Assim, este artigo procura a) enfatizar as 
metáforas de Mauthner sobre a linguagem como uma interpretação precisa sobre os 
vínculos filosóficos entre linguagem e realidade, e b) demonstrar o legado 
epistemológico da crítica de Mauthner da linguagem à filosofia da linguagem de 
Wittgenstein.   
   
 Palavras-chave: linguagem; Mauthner; metáfora; filosofia da linguagem; 
Wittgenstein.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the early 20
th
 century, the critique of language was an emerging area. Several 
studies on language are mainly developed in the first half of this century. These studies 
helped to frame (but not definitively) the critique of language as a new field or branch 
of science based on a new paradigm (the so-called linguistic-turn) and on the original 
studies about language made by Wilhelm von Humboldt, Johann Herder and Johann 
Hamann. 
Following this linguistic tradition, Fritz Mauthner (1849-1923) esteemed 
language as a philosophical inquiry. He measured the philosophical entailments 
between language and reality and the consequent knowledge produced by such 
entailments. He questioned language’s aptitude to express and represent reality and, 
according to him, language is a critical source of knowledge and an unfaithful 
representation of reality, because there is a gap between language and reality, i.e. 
language distorts perception and engenders false and fictitious assumptions about 
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reality. Language fosters superstition, creates gods and idols and exerts a dominating 
power over the intellect. We may regard Mauthner as the destroyer of critical language 
superstitions. Mauthner pointed out a critique of language based on metaphors, which 
would serve to address and clarify the deformation of reality. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), unlike himself suggested, was inspired by 
Mauthner. Both showed interest toward the critical analysis of language and there are 
many conceptual similarities between their language’s conceptions (e.g. concerning the 
use of metaphors to understand language). The correspondence between language and 
reality feed a debate whose origins date, at least, as far back as Plato’s Cratylus 
dialogue. The history of philosophy shows such permanent interest on language and 
critical analysis of language since then. Therefore, this paper seeks a) to emphasize 
Mauthner’s metaphors on language as an accurate interpretation regarding the 
philosophical entailments between language and reality, and b) to demonstrate the 
epistemological legacy of Mauthner’s critique of language to Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
of language. 
The critique of language is important either for the regular language-use or the 
assimilation of knowledge coming from this language-use. In this perspective, a simple 
use of language is a construction of reality, because language is used to represent and to 
express figuratively the reality. Therefore, it is necessary a conceptual framework to 
define the role of philosophy of language and to connect the similarities and 
dissimilarities between Mauthner and Wittgenstein. The relevance of the philosophical 
study of language is due to the complementary between philosophy and language. The 
scientific area we commonly call “philosophy of language” studies language used in 
everyday life and underlines the intentions and recognitions of meanings, the signs and 
their referents, etc. Language has, according to Mauthner, a dual and simultaneous role: 
it is a vehicle of criticism and an object of study. 
In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (hereafter just mentioned Tractatus) 
Wittgenstein pointed out the importance of the whole philosophy as critique of language 
and he noted that the role of philosophy is to clarify the propositions (1999: 4.0031; 
4.112). Wittgenstein presented philosophy as a propaedeutic path. In the Philosophical 
Investigations (hereafter just PI) he said that studying the language phenomenon held to 
understand the meaning and the purpose of the words, taking into account the different 
language games, uses and meanings of words or phrases (1996: § 5). 
To understand Mauthner’s theses, this paper is restricted to his well-known 
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magnum opus entitled Contributions to a Critique of Language (hereafter just CCL), 
mostly the first part of the first volume (entitled the “essence of language”). This text is 
very important, because it established Mauthner’s conductive lines for his philosophical 
thought on language. 
The structure of my paper rests on three essential issues: first, Mauthner’s 
perspective on critique of language; second, Wittgenstein’s perspective on language-
use; third, similarities and dissimilarities between both Mauthner and Wittgenstein uses 
of metaphors about understanding language. 
The word “metaphor” is the touchstone for my paper’s approach and purpose, 
i.e. to settling the connections between Mauthner and Wittgenstein perspectives on 
language. This word is etymologically composed by two Greek terms: “meta”, a noun 
which means “over”, “beyond”, “on the other side of”, “across”; and “pherein”, a verb 
which means “to carry” or “to bear”. This composed word means a “transfer” or “carry 
over” (from metapherein) especially of the sense of one word to a different word, a 
stylistic device in which one transfers the literal meaning of a word to another meaning 
through an implicit comparison or analogy (Balla, 2012: 106). 
The metaphor generates a semantic shift of meanings. It is a sophisticated ability 
to create meanings. According to Aristotle’s Poetics, a metaphor is “the application of 
an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or 
from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion” (1902: 1457b). Therefore, a 
metaphor is the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to 
species or from species to genus or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, 
proportion (Aristotle, 1902: 1457b). A metaphor has a cognitive function, because the 
understanding demands mental effort, as Aristotle remarked: in order to understand a 
metaphor, the hearer has to find something common between the metaphor and the 
thing the metaphor refers to. 
Another interesting perspective on metaphors is the Nietzsche’s essay “On Truth 
and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”. Nietzsche rejected the idea of universal constants and 
claims the “truth” is only “a movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and 
rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem 
to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding” (Nietzsche, 1990: 891). For Nietzsche, 
truths are illusions, i.e. metaphors. Aristotle and Nietzsche, like Mauthner and 
Wittgenstein, they all shared the relevance of metaphors and a sort of concern for 
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understanding language using metaphors. 
 
2. Mauthner’s perspective on critique of language 
Mauthner was a philosopher, a critic, a journalist, a novelist and a dramatist, etc. 
Gershon Weiler said that, although his original insights and his chief merit – he 
“produced a philosophy of language by carrying the principles of empiricism to what he 
believed to be their ultimate conclusions” – Mauthner wasn’t a major figure in the 
history of European philosophy (Weiler, 1970: 1). His marginal position in philosophy 
was not overcome even by Gustav Landauer, who supports his writings. 
However, he had influenced many activities of his time, such as philosophy and 
literature, and he remained on the fringes of a great renown. Mauthner’s work had 
influence beyond Austrian and the German languages. His writings (namely the CCL) 
fascinated James Joyce and Samuel Beckett (Jaurretche, 2005: 54). 
In the CCL, Mauthner remarked that language is an object of study and a means 
for research (Mauthner, 2001: 33). This remark led Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin to 
understand Mauthner as “the first modern European writer who considered language 
itself as a central and crucial topic of philosophical considerations” (Janik & Toulmin, 
1973: 119). 
Mauthner’s main project was the critique of language. As he explained, the 
critique is always called the activity of human reason to separate or differentiate 
(Mauthner, 2001: 33). He focused his studies and projects in this linguistic interest, 
writing several works relating to language, especially the critique of language. At the 
time, Hugo von Hofmannsthal published The Letter of Lord Chandos. Both 
Hofmannsthal and Mauthner are contemporary Austrians concerned with the expression 
of a deep spiritual crisis and the inability to speak, considering language as an 
insufficient, irreducible and threatening means of expression. 
At the end of the 19
th
 century, language has become a central issue for literature, 
philosophy and critical thinking in Austria. This issue was also present in Mauthner’s 
contemporaries and compatriots, as Hofmannsthal, Rainer Maria Rilke, Karl Kraus and 
Robert Musil; then in Ingeborg Bachmann, Peter Handke and, especially, Wittgenstein. 
In 1906, Mauthner realized the importance of the critique of language as a new 
scientific branch (Mauthner, 2001: 24). In this new branch, Mauthner was more 
innovative than Wittgenstein, because the former admitted in this year (when he wrote 
the foreword to the second edition of the CCL, i.e. the first part of the first volume) his 
6 
 
ambitious to be an expert in this new discipline (the critique of language) he just created 
(Mauthner, 2001: 24) while the later, in the same year, enrolled himself at the 
Technische Hochschule (Berlin-Charlottenburg) to study aeronautical engineering. 
Mauthner’s work is concerned with the British philosophical tradition of 
empiricism and nominalism (or relativism). Mauthner thought John Locke was the 
pioneer of the critique of language, due to his meaning theory in the Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding (Janik & Toulmin, 1973: 123; Cloeren, 1988: 55). 
Mauthner’s philosophical work influenced decisively the inquiry and the literary 
perspective of several Viennese authors, such as H. C. Artmann, Gerhard Rühn, Konrad 
Bayer, Oswald Wiener and Friedrich Achleithner. For these authors, the most 
fundamental way to be compromised with language is to be concerned with humankind, 
i.e. to have concerns justified by the attempts to force language to an adequate 
approximation to reality and, therefore, to a clarification or elimination of language’s 
ambiguities (Mauthner, 2001: 40). However, the common aspect to all these authors, 
including Mauthner, was the role of the critique of language regarding the power and 
dominion of the critique itself over the language as an ineffective tool to reflect reality. 
Mauthner’s philosophical thought had various influences, like Ernst Mach’s 
opposition to any universalism, essentialism and positivism, just accepting the 
phenomenal. Mauthner applied to Mach’s definition of language as a “complex of 
feelings” used to refer bodies, things, and the I. He was also influenced by Friedrich 
Nietzsche; whose books he had enjoyed avidly and whose philosophy he had admired. 
E.g. Mauthner agreed with Nietzsche’s thesis that language, in its origin, belongs to the 
epoch (Johnston, 1983: 196-7). 
In addition to Mach and Nietzsche, there are also Kant, Locke and Hume 
(Cloeren 1988: 33, 55). These authors influenced Mauthner so much that he admitted 
his work was a continuation or even the result of these mentioned authors’ 
investigations about the possibility of knowledge. 
Influenced by Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Mauthner intended to undertake a 
Kantian method to defeat metaphysical speculation and to replace the critique of reason 
by a critique of language. If language and reason (including cognition and memory) are 
close, according to Mauthner, and if language is understood from a relative or empiricist 
perspective, there might not be a “pure reason”. But instead of such “pure reason”, 
Mauthner proposed a “linguistic reason”, following Kant’s epistemology. 
For Mauthner, language is essentially metaphorical (Weiler, 1970: 156). He 
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argued that metaphor and association are identical, i.e. there is no difference between 
the mental act which creates a metaphor and that which produces another association, 
because both are acts of comparing (Weiler, 1970: 158). Therefore, language and 
thinking are both metaphorical. 
According to Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, philosophers always treated 
language’s problems since Plato and Aristotle. However, until the late 19th century, 
philosophy of language’s problems had a secondary status regarding to other subjects 
(Janik & Toulmin, 1973: 120). For Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Kant was who 
contributed most to change the situation in support of language’s problems central 
positioning in the philosophical field. However, the problem of defining the purpose 
and the limits of reason suffered a double transformation: first, it becomes the problem 
of defining the essential purpose and the limits of representation; then it turns into the 
language (Janik & Toulmin, 1973: 121). 
Similarly to Karl Kraus’s critical analysis of language, Mauthner’s work was the 
expression and the documentation of a language’s crisis in German-Austrian early 20th 
century studies (Bredeck, 1998: 203). According to Hans-Johann Glock, Mauthner’s 
method was psychological and historical; he took into account the critique of language 
as a social psychology piece (Glock, 1996: 11). The critique’s content was empirical, 
because language is based on sensations, and the result was sceptical, insofar the reason 
is identical to language. Nevertheless, it doesn’t mean to represent reality. That’s why 
Wittgenstein developed his own critique of language (Glock, 1996: 11-2). 
Wittgenstein’s logical critique of language is opposed to Mauthner’s critique of 
language, as it is expressed in the Tractatus (1996: 4.0031). However, Mauthner keeps 
his merit of having been the first to identify, in his Dictionary of Philosophy, the 
philosophy with the critique of language. 
 
3. Wittgenstein’s perspective on language-use 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical perspective about language was the result of a 
remarkable epoch in Vienna. As I mentioned previously, the same happens with 
Mauthner’s perspective. In the early 20th century, Wittgenstein received critical and 
nonconformist influences from culture and society. According to Hans Sluga and David 
Stern, there was a characteristic spirit of fin-de-siècle cultural rebellion in Vienna and 
the Wittgenstein family belonged to a small social group from which the artistic, 
intellectual, and scientific achievements of that culture emerged (e.g. Johannes Brahms, 
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Gustav Mahler, Karl Kraus, Sigmund Freud, Adolf Loos, Gustav Klimt, Oskar 
Kokoschka, Rudolf Boltzmann, Ernst Mach, Moritz Schlick, and Otto Weininger). 
Therefore, the effects of his early upbringing are clearly visible in his thinking (Sluga & 
Stern, 1997: 3). 
Wittgenstein confessed himself “only reproductive” in his thinking: “I think I 
have never invented a line of thinking but that it was always provided for me by 
someone else & I have done no more than passionately take it up for my work of 
clarification. That is how Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, 
Loos, Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa have influenced me.” (Wittgenstein, 1998b: 16). 
Wittgenstein’s later writings are a philosophical critique of language, focusing 
many arguments and perspectives already anticipated by Mauthner in 1901. E.g. the 
idea that language rules are like game rules and the word “language” is also an abstract 
and general term (Janik & Toulmin, 1973: 123). 
Wittgenstein’s critique of meaning (as an object designed or signified by a word) 
dwells upon several related topics. One of them is that there is no language essence, 
because one word can have many uses, forming a field of family resemblances 
(Wittgenstein, 1996: § 67). What forms the concept and gives unity is not a kind of 
uniformity or generality, but a kind of overlapping features. The expression “family 
resemblances” characterizes these similarities: “the various resemblances between 
members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap 
and criss-cross in the same way. – And I shall say: ‘games’ from a family.” 
(Wittgenstein, 1996: § 67). A word can be used in a variety of ways and can have 
multiple meanings or shades of meaning. Wittgenstein exemplified the word “game” as 
a case in point, a word with no single essential meaning, but having a pattern of uses 
related by similarities and differences (Wittgenstein, 1996: § 66). 
The “family resemblances” concept is important to Wittgenstein’s criticism 
about the essentialism of language. But this does not mean that Wittgenstein said games 
have nothing in common. They are activities or proceedings, and there are many 
activities which are not games, like a child playing without rules, throwing a ball with 
no goal. What Wittgenstein means is that there is not a set of conditions fulfilled by all 
games, i.e. there is not a necessary and a sufficient analytic definition for “game” or 
“language-game”, because language is a form of life. 
Thus, if there is any essence of language, it is the multiple relationships between 
language-games. The language’s structure is based on a regulated praxis of language-
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games, which is the unique foundation for them. They do not need any scientific 
foundation or analytic definitions, because the use of expressions is definite, it is the 
result of simple linguistic praxis. For Wittgenstein we do not learn how to use language 
by an inner understanding, but only by training. 
In order to avoid conceptual misunderstandings, Wittgenstein develops the 
difference between a genuine ownership (when one talks about observable objects of the 
external world) and a representational form of ownership (when one talks about 
personal experiences of his internal world). In the former case of ownership (unlike the 
latter case of ownership), it makes sense to ask “Who is the owner of this picture?”. But 
when one says that he has a certain mental image, pain or visual impression (i.e. when 
one says “I have such-and-such visual impression”), one does not have to know who he 
has; there is no deictic use of “this” in respect of our own sense-impressions (Hacker, 
1997: 273). 
The experience of meaning (e.g. the meaning of words for sensations) is related 
to the experience of understanding, since understanding a word is like being able to play 
chess (Wittgenstein, 1988: 55); it is a linguistic technique and it shows us how to use 
expressively a word for a sensation. 
To clear up this point, Wittgenstein presents an analogy: a word is like a railway 
station where a lot of lines cross and the experience of meaning (e.g. having in mind 
something, a sensation connected with a word or an expression to be expressed 
linguistically) would be some sort of vibration showing which way we might travel or 
follow (Wittgenstein, 1988: 57). Then, thinking that the experience of meaning depends 
on the context justifies the variety of meaning/use of polysemous words like “bank” or 
“board”. It also justifies the requirement for a relative understanding of the meaning of 
words, since the determination of their meaning is not always possible. 
E.g. the concept of “meaning” has odd jobs in language-use, because everything 
that belongs to our world or constitutes our forms of life is codified and depends on the 
respective meaning, i.e. everything has a given meaning that indicates it functions and 
what it is. The word “Meaning” is one of the words of which one may say they have 
odd jobs in the language and “what causes most trouble in philosophy is that we are 
tempted to describe the use of important ‘odd-job’ words as though they were words 
with regular functions” (Wittgenstein, 1998a: 43). 
From 1929, Wittgenstein undertook what is conventionally designated by a 
philosophical turn on ordinary language problems. His attention turns to the acquisition 
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and use of informal language as a means of communication. This turn is developed with 
the influence of some Mauthner’s ideas, because Wittgenstein has become acquainted 
with Mauthner’s writings since the Tractatus (Sluga & Stern, 1997: 13). 
On the one hand, there are few similarities between Mauthner and the so-called 
“the early Wittgenstein”, the author of the Tractatus, on the other hand, there are more 
similarities between Mauthner and the also so-called “the second Wittgenstein”, the 
author of the PI. About this last aspect, the situation changes, i.e. the similarities are 
developed and Wittgenstein comes to view philosophy as a critique of language (like 
Mauthner’s perspective). In the following sub-sections, I present some similarities and 
dissimilarities between both authors. 
 
4. Mauthner and Wittgenstein: pragmatic perspectives on language 
A primary and general similarity between Mauthner and Wittgenstein concerns 
the pragmatic perspective on language. Language and its uses are explored in a 
privileged and fundamental way by both authors. For Mauthner, language is a huge 
treasure or a common object which acquires value through the use (Mauthner, 2001: 
51). According to Mauthner, all other objects in use are consumed (e.g. food) or are 
spoiled (e.g. tools and machines) and if language was a tool, it also would be spent or 
spoiled. However, only words can be depreciated, wear or be consumed. Words are 
useful to people, but language is not an object of use or a tool. Language is no more 
than its own use: “language is the use of language” (Mauthner, 2001: 51) and language 
would die if it is not used. For Mauthner, the meaning of a word is clear by the context 
it is used (Mauthner, 2001: 111). Therefore, Mauthner rejects Hegel’s absolute idealism 
(Mauthner, 2001: 51) because such a pragmatic perspective is incompatible with all 
philosophical speculative perspectives, like the Hegelian system, which was understood 
as a model of speculative thought (Cloeren 1988: 216). 
Regarding Wittgenstein’s perspective, the language-use is a central issue of his 
philosophy of language. He said “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” 
(Wittgenstein, 1996: § 43). Wittgenstein’s thesis comes close to what was previously 
mentioned regarding Mauthner’s conception about the meaning of a word be clear by 
the context. However, a dissimilarity between Mauthner and Wittgenstein drift from 
their pragmatic perspective, insofar language and its use are also a dissimilarity, to the 
extent that Mauthner does not consider language as a tool, unlike Wittgenstein (1996, 
§§ 11, 14-5, 23). 
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Mauthner is one of the few authors mentioned by name in Wittgenstein’s 
writings. However, Wittgenstein refuted Mauthner. In the Tractatus, he wrote: “all 
philosophy is ‘critique of language’ (though not in Mauthner’s sense)” (1999: 4.0031). 
Hans Sluga and David Stern explain this allusion stating that it results from a 
demarcation of Wittgenstein, because “at the time he had sided with Russell against 
Mauthner’s antiformalist and sceptical view of language” (Sluga & Stern, 1997: 13). 
Although refuted by Wittgenstein, the refutation is not fortuitous, because the 
dissimilarities between both authors are deep and evident; and there are no further 
developments made by Wittgenstein about Mauthner’s sense. 
If Wittgenstein was “only reproductive” in his thinking, as he confessed 
(Wittgenstein, 1998b: 16), Hans Sluga and David Stern insist on pointing out 
fundamental similarities between Mauthner and Wittgenstein’s remarks on language. 
These similarities constrained Wittgenstein’s philosophical production in all phases of 
his philosophical development, including the last one, which is most obvious. “His 
wariness of scientific theorizing, his scepticism towards psychology, his anti-Cartesian 
reflections on the self, and in particular his picture of language are all in agreement with 
Mauthner” (Sluga & Stern, 1997: 13). 
If philosophy is a critique of language either for Mauthner or Wittgenstein, it has 
a primary and a common aim for both authors: the clarification or elimination of 
language’s ambiguities. According to Mauthner: “this critique [of language] does not 
want more than what the whole linguistic science always wanted: to clarify the 
phenomena of language. Explain language!...” (Mauthner, 2001: 40). 
Regarding Wittgenstein, one can even admit that linguistic concerns cross all his 
writings, because he always demonstrated his philosophical interest: to clarify language-
use in order to obtain the desired understanding. Therefore, Wittgenstein’s early 
philosophy stated: “The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. 
Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of 
elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of ‘philosophical propositions’, 
but to make propositions clear” (Wittgenstein, 1999: 4.112). 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy argued several remarks about his “linguistic 
ideal”. E.g. “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means 
of language” (Wittgenstein, 1996: § 109); “The meaning of a question is the method of 
answering it. (…) Tell me how you are searching, and I will tell you what you are 
searching for” (Wittgenstein, 1998c: § 27); “Thoughts at peace. That is the goal 
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someone who philosophizes longs for (Wittgenstein, 1998b: 50). 
With this new perspective focused on clarification, Wittgenstein understood the 
philosopher as a conceptual therapist: “The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like 
the treatment of an illness” (Wittgenstein, 1996: § 255); “The philosopher is someone 
who has to cure many diseases of the understanding in himself, before he can arrive at 
the notions of common sense. If in life we are surrounded by death, so too in the health 
of our understanding by madness.” (Wittgenstein, 1998b: 50). 
Concerning the Tractatus’s allusion to Mauthner, Wittgenstein points out his 
opposite perspective about knowledge produced, arguing a correspondence between 
language and reality. For Wittgenstein, unlike Mauthner, words are competent to 
represent reality. According to Elizabeth Bredeck, Mauthner has the dubious distinction 
of being mentioned by name in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and “Wittgenstein takes very 
different stances from Mauthner’s on such issues as the possibility of scientific 
knowledge, and maintains that congruence actually does exist between reality and 
language (in the form of logical propositions)” (Bredeck, 1998: 205). 
This difference is about the necessary connection between language and reality. 
According to Mauthner, language shows itself incapable to be the image of reality 
(Mauthner, 2001: 34). For Mauthner, language only provides contingent images of the 
world. There is a gap between language and reality. In the same way human senses 
change over time and needs, images of the world are also contingent if we understand 
the formation and the use of concepts as a process which begins with sense datum and 
determines language production (Bredeck, 1998: 203). Through the notion of contingent 
senses, Mauthner admitted the existence of a gap between what is sensitive and what is 
intelligible. We inherit language when we learn how to use it (Mauthner, 2001: 51) and, 
therefore, we are subjugated to the power of words, which gives us a distorted 
knowledge of the world. Therefore, regarding the previously Wittgenstein’s idea about 
the treatment of a question by the philosopher as the treatment of a disease, there is a 
divergence regarding Mauthner. 
For William Johnston, “reality can only be lived; it cannot be embalmed in 
words”, and “any effort to translate experience into words propagates empty phrases” 
(Johnston, 1983: 198). To check the superstition of words, Mauthner exhorted to the 
silence, i.e. to cease asking questions, because the answers will only multiply webs of 
words. William Johnston concludes Mauthner differs from Wittgenstein in holding that 
there are no meta-language to define the limits of the expression, i.e. the capability of 
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being uttered in words or sentences. 
Mauthner’s scepticism about the abilities to know the world come from his 
epistemological nominalism, which has a sensualist found (Haller, 1988: 11). Such 
scepticism guides Mauthner to define the language’s nature and limits. For Rudolf 
Haller, Mauthner’s CCL developed an “epistemological nominalism whose foundation, 
as in the case of Mach, is based upon the sensualistic premise that nothing is in our 
understanding which does not rest on sensual constituents” (Haller, 1983: 11). 
For Mauthner, the critique of language wasn’t a linguistic analysis, but the 
language’s radical doubt to reflect about reality. In 1906, Mauthner took into 
consideration the thesis that philosophy is a critique and a theory of knowledge and, 
consequently, a critique of language (Mauthner, 2001: 21). While for Wittgenstein this 
was the path chosen to philosophy, for Mauthner the language of science isn’t precise 
when it refers reality. In general, language is only useful to poetry due its metaphorical 
and evocative power. The knowledge of the world is impossible through language and it 
is also impossible to sustain the word’s content. Regarding this aspect, Mauthner and 
Wittgenstein (the one of the Tractatus) agree, because both recognize the mystical 
silence’s solution for language inability to express the reality. As an instrument of 
knowledge, language and its inability foster Mauthner’s sceptical perspective, which 
results in the silence (Bredeck, 1998: 204). 
The metaphorical nature of language obstructs the uniqueness, the non- 
equivocal, and, for this reason, all types of exact scientific knowledge. On the contrary, 
it is possible to sustain the content of a word’s feeling. It is also possible an art which 
acts on the word, a word’s art as the poetry (Mauthner, 2001: 53, 115). The relationship 
between mind and word is metaphorical. All knowledge is limited; it has a linguistic 
feature and results from the transformation or translation (sometimes lost) of sensations 
into concepts. 
In his turn, Wittgenstein delimits the territory of language and conceives a 
pictorial view of language in his Tractatus and Notebooks, i.e. he structures language 
and reality according to the so-called isomorphic or the picture theory of language 
(Wittgenstein, 1979: 5-9, 1999: 1-3.144). Language represents reality as if the words 
were a decal of reality (Wittgenstein, 1999: 4:01). This is the logical uniformity of a 
particular image of language, by which a name means an object (Wittgenstein, 1999: 
3.203). Wittgenstein’s concern goes through a logical improvement of language, in 
order to apply it to science. Therefore, he declares the impossibility to speak with 
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propriety and accuracy about the ineffable, the mystical. 
Taking Goethe’s poetry as an example, Mauthner concludes the power of 
language (as an instrument of knowledge) is very small and the power of language (as 
an artistic medium) is great (Mauthner, 2001: 109). The difference between both authors 
is also reflected in Mauthner’s thesis that men cannot go beyond a metaphorical 
description of the world and in Wittgenstein’s thesis about a bildliche Darstellung of the 
world, i.e. a representation of the world in the form of a mathematical model capable to 
allow a true and certain knowledge of the world. At this point, Wittgenstein refutes 
Mauthner’s scepticism and restores objectivity of science. 
Another remarkable similarity between Mauthner and Wittgenstein is the 
language-game conception. For Mauthner, language is a common property to 
individuals, i.e. a similarity or community of worldviews (Mauthner, 2001: 52). 
Mauthner compares language to a rule of a game, saying: in the majestic social game of 
language, the individual rejoices when, following the same rules of the game, he thinks 
like millions of people (Mauthner, 2001: 52). 
Language is a human activity and the use of language has influence in people 
interactions, because language orders human life in the same way a rule orders a game 
(Janik & Toulmin, 1973: 126). Language and rules of a game are conventions. The 
more individuals play with language and game the more authoritative are these 
conventions. Mauthner and Wittgenstein agree that language is a social game. For both, 
the rules of a game (i.e. the grammar of a language) cannot exist a priori. On the 
contrary, the rules to acquire and use language are developed as a game. 
 
4.1 The ladder metaphor 
The ladder metaphor used by both Mauthner and Wittgenstein shows a great 
similarity. The ladder is, metaphorically, the critique of language for Mauthner and the 
philosophical propositions for Wittgenstein. According to Hermann Cloeren, “Mauthner 
compares the difficulty of conducting a critique of language with climbing the rungs of 
a ladder”, considering that “the climber’s intention is to rise above the lower ground and 
to reach higher levels” (Cloeren, 1988: 218). Hermann Cloeren argues that Mauthner’s 
thesis means the climber can rise and reach, but he is on one of the rungs of a ladder 
which still stands on the ground. For Hermann Cloeren, Mauthner demands that all who 
engage in a critique of language destroy the language behind him, in front of him and in 
him. 
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Mauthner argues that as long as a person climbs up the ladder step by step, he 
has to destroy each step after setting his foot on it, so that people who come next have to 
build new steps to climb the ladder and destroy them again as they rise.  
Wittgenstein also looks into silence from the ladder metaphor. This ladder 
metaphor, used by Mauthner in the CCL, was also used by Wittgenstein at the end of 
the Tractatus: “My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me 
finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, 
over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)” 
(Wittgenstein, 1999: 6.54). He means people must surmount these propositions to see 
the world rightly. In the final remarks of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein uses the metaphor 
of the ladder to express the function of his book, which is to be used in order to climb 
on it, in order to “see the world rightly”. Paradoxically, the book and its theses must be 
recognized as nonsense and be thrown away. Hence, “whereof one cannot speak, 
thereof one must be silent” (Wittgenstein, 1999: 7). 
Although both Mauthner and Wittgenstein adopted the ladder metaphor to 
illustrate how language is acquired and used, each author assigned to the ladder (i.e. the 
language) a peculiar sense. Mauthner associated the ladder with the critique of language 
activity and the circus act in which a clown climbs the ladder till the top and then tries 
to throw it down or throw it away, creating a comical and tragic sense at the same time. 
The situation is itself already impossible to happen, because we can never get unstuck 
the language of the land even in a tragic, poetic or humorous situation. If the ladder of 
language is discarded, it would make the person fall to the ground. In turn, Wittgenstein 
gave a more therapeutic and mystical sense to the ladder metaphor. A sense that not 
only warns about the problems that can arise from the misuse of language but also 
elucidates the misinterpretation. 
 
4.2 The large city metaphor 
Another metaphor about language concerns to “a large city”. Mauthner 
compares language to a large city as if language was formed by the same process of the 
city: the language was formed as a large city, room by room, window by window, 
apartment by apartment, house by house, street by street, neighbourhood by 
neighbourhood; and all of it came together, joined (Mauthner, 2001: 53). 
Wittgenstein also used this metaphor. In Wittgenstein perspective, the fragments 
of our linguistic practices are interrelated and, therefore, part of a global system. In his 
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later writings, Wittgenstein described this idea when he compared language and a city: 
“Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old 
and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded 
by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses” 
(Wittgenstein, 1996: § 18). 
The metaphors used by Mauthner are evident in Wittgenstein’s writings: the 
sense assigned by Mauthner is subsequently adapted by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein only 
could be influenced by Mauthner’s CCL, as it happens with this metaphor seeing 
language as a large city. According to Hans Sluga and David Stern: “When he later 
rejected the idea of language as a single, unified structure and instead wrote that ‘our 
language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets… surrounded by a 
multitude of new boroughs’ he was, once again, employing a metaphor he had borrowed 
from Mauthner”, who, in turn, had taken it from Sextus Empiricus (Sluga & Stern, 
1997: 13). 
Hans-Johann Glock says this analogy between language and a city previously 
occurred in Boltzmann’s Physics and Mauthner’s CCL, both mentioning the city centre 
(i.e. the everyday language) is a maze of twisting streets, while more recent additions 
(e.g. the specialized terms of chemistry or mathematics) are the suburbs and has straight 
and uniform lines (Glock, 1996: 186). 
 
4.3 The map metaphor 
Another interesting and shared metaphor is the map metaphor. The usefulness of 
language’s metaphors for human knowledge has to do with the adoption of the map 
metaphor as a representation device and a meaningful use regarding reality and 
knowledge of reality. For Mauthner, the power of language lies in its ability to be a 
meaningful representation of reality, like the drawings illustrating a scientific text. In 
this case, Mauthner argues we would consider foolish someone who would want to 
make a research trip through Africa on a map, instead in loco (i.e. there, in the ground) 
and we would say to him “even with the most powerful lens you could not find on the 
map more than your ancestors already discovered or believed to discover” (Mauthner, 
2001: 71). 
For Mauthner, drawings are always schemes independently they are natural and 
perfect. Drawings are like any other image or representation; they are mere referential 
substitutes of the proper things they represent. The same goes with the words. This idea 
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has ancient antecedents in Plato’s Cratylus, where the cognoscibility of things as 
noumena (i.e. themselves and not by their names) is elucidated. In the Cratylus, Plato 
refers to the virtue and the fallibility of names in a sufficiently useful way in order to 
clarify the importance of this reflection for the study of meaning processes. The 
conclusion of this Platonic dialogue is: names and words are generally intermediate 
elements between the cognoscible person and the object of knowledge (Plato, 1998: 
439b). 
If it is possible to know things accurately through their names (as an image of 
things or a faithful reproduction of reality and truth) or through the things themselves 
(the truth itself), which of these two forms of knowledge would be the best and the more 
precise? Despite this Plato’s question (Plato, 1998: 439a-439d), it easily follows the 
perspective on language as a symbolic or conventionalist conception. 
In the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Wittgenstein mentions some 
blindness situations which don’t allow a normal behaviour, i.e. a common behaviour 
similar to other people. Wittgenstein presents the example of a person who does not like 
to see a drawing or a photograph, because that person says the discoloration of human 
beings is ugly, and the example of a person who admire a landscape while he looks at a 
map and exclaims “what a glorious sight!” (Wittgenstein, 1998d: § 170). 
A representation (given by a visual sign) of an object (e.g. a pipe) is always a 
representation of an object and never the object itself, i.e. in a representation process, 
the representative is never the represented, like Magritte’s picture subtitled “Ceci n’est 
pas une pipe”, which is clearly explained by Michel Foucault (1983: 23). There is 
always a semantic transitivity shown by the classical expression aliquid pro aliquot, i.e. 
the representative (the map) and the represented (the meaning or the information given 
by the map). 
Wittgenstein’s intention is to warn the wrong uses and misinterpretations of 
language. One might compare “I am having…” to a direction-arrow on a map: the 
words “I am having…” and a direction-arrow belongs to the ordinary language and to a 
map, respectively; and they both show what we can do with the language and with the 
map. Wittgenstein argues it is possible to compare the use of certain psychological 
propositions in the first person (e.g. “I’m having a toothache”) with the direction 
indicated by an arrow on a map. Though the proposition and the arrow belong to 
different domains of meaning, both are susceptible to everyday linguistic uses, both 
necessarily represent something and both show what we can do with them, i.e. with the 
18 
 
language and with the map. Both language-use and map-use presuppose a technical 
reference. The act of representing is presented neither in the language nor in the map. 
The map represents, because its function is identical to the grammar. The representation 
is the necessary and sufficient condition for something be a map, i.e. be a map imply 
essentially two things: first, the map represent a given reality; second, the map is used in 
a certain way. The use of the map makes it a map. Similarly, it is the use of a word or 
proposition that renders it intelligible. When we learn to read a map, we learn how to 
use certain signs which are printed on paper. In this perspective, a map is like a 
proposition: it is something that should be used in a certain and definite way, i.e. a map 
also represents a certain technique or a way to use it, as if it was a given manual of 
instruction. But a map does not teach us how to use it. 
What Wittgenstein sought to demonstrate with this perspective on language is 
the meaning of some words (e.g. “gold tooth” or “book”) can be revealed when we 
point to something, while the meaning of other words, expressions or psychological 
propositions (e.g. “toothache”) cannot be expressed by in an indicative language. 
Therefore, while a person reading a map is someone who knows how to use a map, a 
speaker is someone who knows how to use a word, an expression, a proposition or any 
acoustic image (sound) or visual image (the graphic aspect of a word). The reader of a 
map and the speaker of the words are similar regarding the sine qua non condition to 
use and master a technique. 
On the one hand, if one claims that a given sheet of paper is a map, one is saying 
such sheet of paper has a definite use; on the other hand, if one understands certain 
sounds or marks as words and propositions, one is able to use them according to a 
defined manner. 
The system of language is also a chain of signs, applications and consequences 
and it is what makes us able to express the understanding of an image in a proposition. 
Through replacements of mental images by public signs or common words, we 
constantly get different interpretations and understandings about what is meant and said. 
However, the images and the signs, per se, are meaningless, since “only in the stream of 
thought and life do words have meaning” (Wittgenstein, 1998d: § 504; 1993b: § 173). 
Otherwise, we become conscious of the nakedness of the words: “[…] in ordinary 
circumstances these words and this picture have an application with which we are 
familiar. – But if we suppose a case in which this application falls away we become as it 
were conscious for the first time of the nakedness of the words and the picture.” 
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(Wittgenstein, 1996: § 349). 
This quoted remark represents the support for the Wittgensteinian thesis that it is 
essential for us to grasp the familiar application of language in order to understand other 
people and, consequently, be understood by them. This grammatical principle lies in the 
claim that “a rule stands there like a sign-post” that does not leave room for doubts or 
that sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes don’t (Wittgenstein, 1996: § 85). 
If a sign-post says “To Coton” and I follow it, how do I know how to follow it? Why is 
the rule not expressed by “You have to turn left at a right angle”? “A signpost says ‘To 
Coton’ and you follow it. How do you know how to follow it? Why shouldn’t it be the 
rule that we had to go at right angles to the left? Or backwards from the arm to the 
hand?” (Wittgenstein, 1988: 9). 
How do we know what it is to follow a sign-post? A sign-post corresponds to a 
rule and we are trained to follow it, since there is no rule without a technique. “But, 
someone says, we could give more directions instead. But will it do? We learn a rule 
partly by training, partly by explanation; whether we have learnt it can be found out in 
two ways: (i) make one do the thing, (ii) ask for an explanation” (Wittgenstein, 1988: 
127). The normal procedure is to follow a sign-post, i.e. the direction in which it is 
pointing. If a sign-post is a rule, how is the rule explained? It could be explained by a 
praxis reached by training; or by the explanation “To follow the direction in which the 
sign is pointing”. The sign-post example is similar to that of following incorrectly the 
rule “writing down series of the form 0, n, 2n, 3n, etc.” with the orders of the form 
“+n”, i.e. it would present similarities with one in which a person naturally reacted to 
the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction of the line from 
fingertip to wrist, not from the wrist to fingertip (Wittgenstein, 1996: 185). 
“The directions are sufficient if they ‘make you go the way’, but there’s not such 
a thing as ‘all the directions’. For example, you see a sign-post; how does it direct you? 
How printed sign connect with your ‘getting it’? Suppose we add another direction to 
the sign, say, ‘read this from left to right’. Is that the last explanation?” (Wittgenstein, 
1988: 245). By the rule, people learn a rule by training, finding out whether it’s enough 
by looking at what is done. 
The map metaphor shows how ordinary language is socially used and how it is 
useful to mean something, since there is nothing that signifies by itself. For this reason, 
Wittgenstein says that a Chinese sentence seems a mere series of sounds for those who 
do not understand it and “don’t have any thoughts in connection with” it (Wittgenstein, 
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1993c: § 104). Language misunderstandings came from the superficial use of grammar, 
which looks only to the structure or characteristics of words. To avoid conceptual 
misunderstandings and mistakes in the philosophical activity, we must take into account 
a depth dimension of grammar, the atmosphere of each and every word within its 
language-game (Wittgenstein, 1996: § 664). 
For example, the above-mentioned sentences “I have a toothache” and “I have a 
book” have the same structure. But they do not have the same “depth grammar”. 
Wittgenstein distinguishes the “dimension of depth” from the “dimension of surface”, 
i.e. “depth grammar” (the “significant meaning-use” of words) from “surface grammar” 
(the sentence structure or the immediately evident characteristics of words). 
Something different takes place when words are uttered significantly from when 
the same words are merely uttered. As Wittgenstein expresses it, in the first case, I say 
that words have a depth dimension or that something goes on with me, inside my mind, 
as I utter them (i.e. I felt that words have an atmosphere), unlike in the second case 
(Wittgenstein, 1996: § 594). The “depth grammar” and “surface grammar” concepts 
justify a better language-use understanding and avoid confusions in the common use of 
ordinary language. 
Both Mauthner and Wittgenstein showed concerns about the misunderstandings 
derived from the misuse of language. The semantic difference has to do with what 
Mauthner calls “the aging of the word”. The classic example is the biblical phrase “In 
the beginning God created the heaven and the earth” (Mauthner, 2001: 74). Some words 
are polysemous, abstract (with metaphysical content) or without extra-linguistic and 
observable referent. The frequent attribution of a concrete reality in these abstract and 
general words (e.g. “God”, “heaven”, “eternity”, etc.) caused speculative confusion and 
troubled Mauthner. It is necessary to take an anti-Kantian metaphysical effort to impose 
limits on the expression. 
Assuming a nominalist and a radical philosophical position, Mauthner 
considered that all philosophical problems were, indeed, problems related to language 
(Janik & Toulmin, 1973: 122). Mauthner took a radical position on what should be 
philosophy: a critical theory of knowledge and, therefore, a critique of language. In the 
CCL, Mauthner wrote he was confident for having chosen a right path for philosophy, 
i.e. a critique of knowledge which is a critique of language (Mauthner, 2001: 21). 
For Elizabeth Bredeck, Mauthner developed a theory of knowledge which ends 
in the empiricism, but he also redefines some basic concepts (Bredeck, 1998: 203), in 
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particular the concept of “language”, regarding to something else than speech, because 
it is the medium of all cognition and, as such, an instrument of knowledge. For 
Mauthner, mental images of reality are created through language and this thesis is 
unlike the Wittgenstein conception of language-game. 
 
5. Conclusion 
There are several issues about language addressed by both Mauthner and 
Wittgenstein. Regardless the treatments assigned by each author, these issues are 
common interests (e.g. individual language; exteriorization of sensations; the social 
nature of language). 
Regarding the social nature of language (as well as the subjacent issue of 
individual languages) there is a conceptual approach also evident in the works of both 
Mauthner and Wittgenstein. Mauthner said in his Dictionary of Philosophy that if the 
nature could speak, it couldn’t speak our language (Leinfellner, 2005: 466). This idea is 
very similar to what Wittgenstein expressed in the part two of the PI: “If a lion could 
talk, we could not understand” (Wittgenstein, 1996: 223). 
Language is the product of a cultural and social dimension, connecting people in 
a complex and diverse way. What Wittgenstein meant by this statement is that language 
is a form of life, a sort of result from cultural processes. The required skills to use 
language are acquired in society. Therefore, if a lion could speak, we would not be in a 
position to understand it, because human speakers and lions don’t share the same form 
of life; don’t have the same course of life and culture. To imagine a language means to 
imagine a form of life (Wittgenstein, 1996: § 19). This perspective is consistent with 
Mauthner’s perspective, according to which the meaning of a word is only clear due its 
context (Mauthner, 2001: 111). 
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